



Creating Confidence and Democracy in Previous Autocracies Problems and Possibilities

Report from an international workshop at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria organised by the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, Universities and Swedish Institutes in Cooperation for Internationalization (USI) and Alexandria University.

September 11-14 2011.



In the aftermath of the revolution and before the upcoming elections from November 2011 to January 2012 in Egypt, researchers from Swedish universities and Alexandria University met at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria to discuss the creation of trustful and stable democratic institutions in societies previously ruled by authoritarian means. Drawing on experience and knowledge of successes and failures of democratization processes in Eastern Europe and North Africa during the last decades, the participants explored challenges and possibilities for developing democracy in Egypt and the Arab world in general.

List of participants:

Abdel Waheb, Mohammed Refaat	Professor, Department of Constitutional Law, Alexandria University
Aggestam, Karin	Associate professor, Director for Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science, Lund University
Ashour, Ahmet sakr	Professor, Faculty of Commerce, Alexandria University
Bull, Thomas	Professor, Faculty of Law, Uppsala University
Galaby, Aly	Dr., Department of Sociology, Alexandria University
Hanafy, Hind Mamdouh	President of Alexandria University
Hansen, Peo	Associate Professor, Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society, Linköping University
Holm, Gunnel	Head of Administration, Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology, Lund University, USI administration.
Holmén, Janne	Dr., Department of History, Uppsala University
Imam, Mohammed Kamal	Professor, Faculty of Law, Alexandria University
Jansson, Per	Dr., Faculty of Political Science, Linköping University
Lagergren, Aida Arago	Dr., Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University
Lagervall, Rickard	Ph.D. student in Islamology, Lund University
Mansour, Mamdouh	Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Alexandria University
Månsson, Anette	Vice-Dean, Section of Humanities and Social Sciences, Uppsala University
Rennick, Sarah Ann	Ph.D. student in Political Science, Lund University
Sadeq, Hisham	Professor, Private International Law, Alexandria University

Schierenbeck, Isabell

Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science,
Gothenburg University

Seyad, Sideek Mohamed

Dr., Faculty of Law, Stockholm University

Sternemo, Cecilia

Deputy Director of the Swedish Institute in
Alexandria

Wiberg, Eva,

Dean of Undergraduate and Graduate Education,
Faculties of Humanities and Theology, Lund
University. Chair of the organizing network
“Universities and Swedish Institutes in
Cooperation for Internationalization” (USI).

Welcome

Cecilia Sternemo, Deputy Director of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria welcomed all participants to the workshop. She presented the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, which for the last ten years has been an international forum for dialogue on democracy and human rights, bringing together researchers, teachers and other stakeholders in discussions and collaborations on a range of issues. She highlighted a current focus on women's rights and democracy, and expressed her confidence that this workshop will prove to be yet another fruitful platform for future cooperation and dialogue.

Prof. Hind Mamdouh Hanafy, President of Alexandria University, presented some of the challenges facing the Egyptian society. Bringing justice and equality, sustainable development and human rights into society requires local, national and international efforts in building bridges between people and she presented her hopes for future collaboration with Swedish universities with reference to the transition period on which Egypt is about to embark.

Dr. Eva Wiberg, Dean of Undergraduate and Graduate Education, Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology, Lund University and Chair of the network *Universities and Institutes in Cooperation for Internationalization* (USI) presented the network as a unique and qualified forum for international partnerships. The USI was created to promote international cooperation within higher education and academic research, and ongoing activities within the network bring master students, teachers and researchers together in interdisciplinary activities. Dr. Wiberg articulated her hopes for the workshop to be the start of educational cooperation, research collaboration and future dialogue through seminars and conferences.

Summary of Presentations

Dr. Mohammed Refaat Abdel Waheb, Alexandria University

Constitutional Reasons of Political Revolutions

Dr. Abdel Waheb stated that although the revolution in Egypt was driven by the youth, the seeds were planted long ago and since then there has been an accumulation of injustice. He characterised contemporary Egypt as being a society with high unemployment rates, particularly among the youth, and widespread corruption, where official appointments, even for judges, take place through family or similar connections. Even access to medical care can be a question of connections with financial assets. Today young people ask themselves why they should get educated if they have no possibility of having a career and as a result hopes for the future have been undermined. He noticed that although human rights are well known worldwide, it is the national regime that ultimately decides on whether these rights should be enjoyed by the population or not. Further, human rights and democracy cannot be guaranteed with fraud elections. Therefore there is a call for international supervision of the upcoming elections. A strong parliament is necessary for a democratic political regime and there is a need to purify the power from the Mubarak regime. Unfortunately, he states, there are not enough forces today for this to be successful, so the short term development in Egypt is unclear. The hope is to have a constitution before the elections.

Dr. Aida Aragao Lagergren, Uppsala University

The Importance and Role of Electoral Observation in Strengthening Democracy

Quoting Kofi Annan's words "Building democracy is a complex process. Elections are only a starting point but if their integrity is compromised, so is the legitimacy of democracy", Dr. Aragao Lagergren noticed that elections are human rights in practice; that they are vital to democratic government, but they are not sufficient. Where elections are marred, people lose faith in democracy and the political process, and human rights and security are put at risk. Election processes are regulated by the international standards of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 1948 and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR) from 1966. Dr. Aragao Lagergren emphasised the importance of not approaching elections as a "one day" practice; that there is a pre- and post-phase in addition to the Election Day. Legal frameworks, electoral administration, campaigning and dealing with complaints and appeals are important aspects of elections, and thus by electoral observation.

Electoral observation is the method used to assess electoral processes according to international standards and best practices for genuine democratic elections. Impartiality, equal access to state resources and media as well as the degree of freedom enjoyed by the candidates to assemble and express their opinion, are crucial aspects that need to be addressed in election processes. International electoral observations can enhance transparency and voters confidence, and deter fraud and tensions in particular electoral processes, but also address shortcomings and help to improve election standards in a long term perspective. International observation must also reflect on questions like whether international standards are negotiable or not, whether it can be

used to legitimize illegitimate processes and in that case, whether it should be tolerated to a certain degree.

Prof. Thomas Bull

Development and Maintenance of Democratic Institutions

Prof. Bull explained that democratic institutions are “two sided”. There is an input side of electoral processes as well as an output side of the values elected. The public administration has an important role in a democratic society. It turns issues and values of the elected government into practice, and weak administration will undermine efforts to achieve changes in society and to create trust among citizens. As such, administration is also a political tool of change and reform, which area real challenges for any political system. In order to support democratic change and reform, the public administration must build upon the following internal organisation: Firstly, civil servants must be trained in their public role, which includes a certain loyalty to the system - even when it is in conflict with personal progress. Secondly, advancement in the public administration must be based only on merits. Lastly, systems of control, such as external supervision, transparency and public access, must operate to guarantee the functionality of the administration. Misuse of systems must be criminalized and sanctions made public.

Trust is a central aspect of the development and maintenance of democratic institutions, and of the building of an overall democratic society. Democracy must be built on trust in vital systems and administrations, and the public administration cannot function properly without being trusted.

Dr. Isabell Schierenbeck

Political Leadership and Democratisation

Associate Professor Isabell Schierenbeck presented the ongoing research project “The Road to Democracy. Exploring the Impact of Leadership Guidance” conducted together with her colleague Ulrika Möller and financed by the Swedish Research Council. The main research question of this project is “Why do some newborn states overcome obstacles to their political existence and emerge as democracies?” The project ascribes importance to the agency of political leaders in processes of democratization. The theoretical approach rests on a comprehensive notion of agency where political leadership is seen as a collective activity of advocating social change. The agency is dependent on followership and is carried out at a particular moment in political time. The hypothesis of the project is that leadership action needs to be adjusted according to whether it is communicated for the purpose of mobilizing for independence or for the purpose of building and consolidating the democratic state. When the leadership succeeds in doing this in symbolic, strategic and relational ways, the road towards democracy is more likely to succeed. Within the symbolic dimension importance is given to “the master narrative”; political leaders making use of certain symbolic resources to define “the people”. Within the strategic dimension the focus lies on the need of the political leadership to interact with other elites, such as military leaders and religious communities. Finally, within the relational dimension the sources of legitimacy for political authority are studied as essential to how the relationship between a political

leader and his/her followers is established and maintained. The project consists of in-depth case studies of leadership action of formative moments during nationhood periods and nascent statehood periods in India, Pakistan, Israel, and Palestine/Palestinian Authority. Preliminary results of the project all focus on the aspects within the political leadership that constitute the crucial shift in strategies promoting democratization: The first aspect is that of a shift from intensity to inclusiveness. There is a need for the leadership to produce a national conception that legitimizes the demand for independence (“we and them”) during nationhood. However, this needs to be replaced by strategies to gain support for a more inclusive national conception that decreases the risk of state disintegration (“we”) during nascent statehood. The second aspect involves a shift where the political leaders bargain with other elites to start setting limits for informal elite interaction and influence. There is a need for the leadership to cooperate and bargain with other elites (religious, military, bureaucracy) to improve the prospects for independence during nationhood. During nascent statehood, however, this cooperation needs to be replaced by policies restraining elite influence and informal interactions between elite groups and the leadership. The last aspect concerns the relational dimension where followers must turn into voters. During nationhood, there is a need to establish a supportive followership by ascribing informal political authority to the national leader (such as the freedom fighter, the founding father). During nascent statehood, however, a shift towards support from autonomous and less faithful followers should establish formal political authority of the state leaders.

Can the preliminary results of this project be generalized to cases of regime changes, such as in Egypt? Yes, there are reasons to believe that. The aspect of setting limits for informal elite interaction is important to address after the election and in the process of forming a new Egyptian government. Furthermore, the aspect of inclusiveness (rather than intensity) is important to bear in mind when re-writing the Egyptian constitution.

Prof. Mohamed Kamal Imam

The Role of Religion in Changing the Social Systems

Prof. Kamal Imam underlines that religion has a positive role to play in transition periods. Religion provides society with a system of values which in turn can be embraced by rules, regulations and laws. Freedom and equality among people, independent of gender and religion, are basic values essential in Islam. Islam as an ethical authority may provide societies with a human rights system as the role of religion is to provide judgment to the benefit of society. As always present in a society, religion should therefore be considered a tool in periods of change. All religions are interested in establishing good conditions for mankind and could therefore be said to be responsible for bringing about social change.

Dr. Mamdouh Mansour

Egyptian Foreign Policy after the 25th January Revolution

In his speech, Dr. Mansour asserted that after the revolution there will be a new era in foreign relations in Egypt. During the Mubarak era, foreign policy did not reflect national interest; rather it has worked against national interest in favour of American and Israeli agendas. Foreign policy has been very limited and modest and thus reflected the interest of narrow elites of individuals, inside or outside of Egypt. The post revolution agenda has been more positive and ambitious, and in line with national interests, however it is still too early to say if this attitude will persist, as the military council still is in charge of running the country. The development of the foreign policy will depend on the new government. There is, however, a tangible shift in Egypt-Israeli relations and the national sovereignty of the country is revised. Hopefully, Egypt will adopt a clear and comprehensive agenda built on national interest like mobilizing financial support, enhance development programs, assure regional stability and sound cooperation based on mutual respect and territorial integrity, respect for the other, human rights, culture and environment and combatting terrorism.

Foreign policy is a mirror of the political regime, but right now it is not clear what kind of a regime will be formed in the future. All depends on how different movements; like the liberal, left, the Islamist (and so on), will develop and merge on the political scene. Dr. Mansour expects the Islamic movement to harvest many votes and this will have impact on other Islamic oriented parties. Some kind of change is expected, but no one really knows what to expect, since the political actors themselves are not really aware of what is happening: They are lacking political experience and are driven by enthusiasm rather than knowledge. The political agenda, as well as externally imposed conditions will be significant factors influencing the orientation of Egyptian foreign policy. Although theoretically possible, extreme viewpoints are not likely to be the driving forces and major changes are not to be expected, as those who carried out the revolution are not in the government.

Ph.D. student Rickard Lagervall

The Role of Religion in a Democratic Society

There seems to be a widespread idea that religion in a very special way is a complicating factor which sets it apart from other human phenomena and, as a consequence, that when political actors base their claims on religious foundations the possibility of a constructive debate is foreclosed. Rickard Lagervall would rather contend that religio-political actors are not essentially different from other ones and that they in order to gain political influence have to adapt to political realities of public opinion and constraining state structures. Secularity is often understood not only as separation of religion and politics but as the demise of religion. It is arguable; however, that secularity is not so much about the degree of a population's religious commitment as the position of religion in a modern national state. There are especially two aspects to underline:

First, when the modern national states emerged in the 16th century and onwards, the formation of national identities was linked to religious belonging. In the 17th century Sweden, for example, a Swedish subject was by definition a Lutheran Christian and

conversion was punishable with exile or even death. During the 18th century, as a result of the need of foreign expertise, foreign Jews and Catholics were allowed to practice their faiths discreetly, but it was not until 1870 that Swedish citizens were allowed to convert to another officially recognized Christian church. Finally, in 1951 citizens were allowed not to belong to any religious community at all. In response to the Christian awakening movements a law interdicting conventicles; that is gatherings in private homes to read and discuss the Bible, because they were seen as undermining the State Church's interpretative monopoly. This interdiction was in force until 1858. The various forms of secular systems in Europe emerged not so much because people became less religious as because of the emergence of different, often mutually hostile, Christian sects. In *The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution* (1992) the English historian Christopher Hill describes how the presence of members of the English Parliament in the 17th century, who belonged to different mutually hostile Christian sects, gradually made people realize the futility of supporting political claims with religious arguments. It went so far that those members who referred to the Bible were mocked by other members, not because these had become less religious but because they realized the futility of such argumentations. Religious movements, many of which would be regarded as fundamentalist today, therefore played an unintentional role in secularizing European politics and society.

After a period when the various European churches gradually had come to accept various forms of secular systems in the European states during the 20th century, religion returned in a paradoxical way at the end of that century as a central issue for defining national identities. This time it was not Jews or Christian minorities (Catholics in Protestant states and Protestants in Catholic states) that were perceived as threats to national unity but the relatively newly arrived Muslim immigrants. In the 18th and 19th century Europe Jews were thought to be unable to be enlightened, because of belonging to a religion perceived by Christians as more primitive than Christianity, and, in Protestant Northern Europe and in North America, Catholics were suspected of following a foreign authority (the Pope) uncritically and hence having double loyalties. In a way that is parallel to today's debate where practicing Muslims are sometimes described as blindly following sharia which is often understood as a clear-cut and static religious law (though it could rather be described as an interpretative tradition). In other words, what is questioned is the ability of practicing Muslims to act as modern autonomous subjects. Islam has come to symbolize the threat of the emergence of parallel legal systems, in spite of the fact that Christian and Jewish communities face similar challenges of harmonizing religious norms with secular laws in marriage, divorce and inheritance. This has manifested itself in the recent debates on the interdiction of facial veils in public spaces. They have been intense in spite of the fact that the attempts at estimations made in Denmark, the Netherlands and France have arrived at the conclusion that less than half a percent of the female population in each respective country wear such veils (and half of those who do are estimated to be native converts). Another example is the discussion on inscribing the Judeo-Christian roots of the Europeans civilization into the EU constitution.

Secondly, an important aspect of secularity is its connection to the modern national state which is characterized not only by granting citizens certain freedoms, such as freedom of religion, but also by its interventionist character. Even the French state, one of the hallmarks of a secular state, has showed its ambition to intervene in French Muslims' affairs, for example by establishing the The French Council of the Muslim Faith as an

instance representing French Muslims to the state. In the Middle East several states after independence during the 20th century strove to take control over the religious field, in Egypt by the nationalization of the *awqaf*, the religious foundations, and of the al-Azhar university, and thus relegating the position of the *ulama* to that of civil servants dependent on the state for their living. This is a new situation compared to the pre-modern one, in which the *ulama* had complicated and often tense relations with the rulers but often enjoyed a fairly high degree of independence because of the *awqaf*, which financed al-Azhar and other religious institutions.

It appears important to avoid essentialist notions of religion as an unchanging and monolithic entity independent of social and historical conditions. Religion is articulated and positioned in various ways in relation to society and the state. Similarly it is important to avoid essentialist notions of concepts such as modernity and secularity. Modern secular state systems are shaped differently as products of different and contingent histories each of which is specific for each state.

As an islamologist Mr. Lagervall has a natural interest in Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, though he stressed the importance of placing such movements into the broader context of other competing social and political movements in today's Egypt. From an outsider's perspective, the more open political environment that is taking shape since the fall of the former president Mubarak looks like a mixed blessing for the Brotherhood. Though its strong organization is an asset in the electoral campaign of its official Freedom and Justice Party, the very hierarchical structure which helped the movement survive eight decades of repression has already resulted in internal tensions and splits into at least two rival political parties formed by the reformist wing during the spring of 2011. If the Wasat party, formed in the 1990s by members of the Brotherhood who eventually were forced to leave the movement is added, there are now at least four different political parties originated from the Brotherhood which have entered different coalitions and which present different ideas on the role of religion in the future Egypt.

Associate professor Karin Aggestam

Liberal Peacebuilding, Democratization and Regional Security: Opportunities and Pitfalls

Karin Aggestam briefed in her presentation about ongoing research projects at the department of Political Science. One project focuses on hydropolitics and the Jordan River. Another one is exploring a number of vertical and horizontal peace gaps in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. She informed about a large FP7 research project (funded by the European Union), which she is currently coordinating on just and durable peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans together with seven partner universities in Europe and the Middle East. In her presentation, she reflected on a number of critical perspectives of the liberal peace notion. The concept builds on the premise that liberal democracies do not fight wars between themselves. Liberal peacebuilding also favors privatization and marketization as part of various efforts to consolidate peace. She underlined that we need to enhance knowledge about the transformative nature of conflict. Contemporary conflicts are often rooted, not so much in ideology as observed during the Cold War, but more often related to questions of identity politics. Also civil casualties of war have increased dramatically in the 20th century and the majority of conflicts are today internal rather than interstate. There has also been a drastic increase

in peacebuilding missions around the world. Research has shown that there is a failure to recognise how fragile and cyclical the transition between war and peace is. Violence may increase rather than decrease in post-conflict societies. The question about timing when to announce elections is crucial. To hold early elections may generate counterproductive results, such as increased tension and violence. Another noticeable trend among international donors is “privatization” of peacebuilding efforts. Various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are assuming a number of important tasks through donor economic assistance. This is part of the effort to enhance local ownership and strengthen and build institutions to resolve conflicts peacefully.

Prof. Ahmed sakr Ashour

Corruption and Reform Challenges

Prof. Ashour explained that the development of the whole region has been conditioned by corruption and consequently societies in the region are associated with oppression, stagnation, inequality, social decay and malfunctioning. Prof. Ashour mentioned four types of corruption: Political corruption is when the state power is hijacked, the political arena is monopolized, political processes and legitimacy is manipulated and freedoms restricted. Commonly, political power is used to create personal fortunes. Economic corruption works through political power, which aims to control the financial policy of key sectors and markets. Administrative corruption in Egypt is widespread and all areas are affected, from health and infrastructure to business and public companies. This form of corruption is caused by nepotism, low salaries and bureaucracy. Finally, social and cultural corruption is the erosion of trust undermining the ethics and moral values in central institutions and in the society. The high prevalence of corruption in Egypt has created tolerance towards its existence; it has become “a way of life” for Egyptians, and an enormous number of corruption-cases are presented for the courts. Corruption severely affects society at large and it is enforcing itself. Political reform is the key to control it, providing political competitiveness, power circulation and accountability. After Mubarak’s fall, corruption practices are still prevailing in Egypt. The need for social and moral reform is slowly being recognized, although it has not yet been addressed politically, and it will constitute a serious challenge to the future Egyptian politics and society. Changes will necessitate a comprehensive program for reform, a clear anti-corruption strategy and short- and long-term initiatives.

PhD student Sarah Ann Rennick

Social Justice, the Arab Spring and EU Peacebuilding

Since late December 2010, the Arab world has witnessed the most dramatic social and political events in at least a generation: widespread protests assembling a broad spectrum of social and sectarian groups; the ouster of at least three long-standing authoritarian regimes (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) with perhaps others to follow; the onset of what appears to be a civil war in at least two countries (Syria, Yemen). While these events are today highly political in nature, driven by a strong desire for political reform and a partial or in some cases total reformulation of government and the people’s role in it, it is worth remembering that they were initially launched not by political demands

but rather economic ones. Anger over the lack of employment opportunities, rising prices coupled with the reduction in subsidies, and the deteriorating social conditions were amongst the largest drivers of social mobilization and protest against governments, as has been historically the case in this region: the modern Arab states founded their legitimacy at least partially on the promise of fulfilling a social contract based on a system of redistributive social welfare, targeting certain key sectors in particular. It is thus within this context that we understand the current uprisings in the Arab.

The ideal of redistributive social welfare (al-'adalatt al-ijtima'iyya) has its origins in Islam and the Qur'an's precise guidelines for how the community should be structured. Amongst these are extensive sections covering what can be termed the "moral economy," the contours of which include detailed rules regarding financial transactions, the duty to protect the weak, the specific stipulation of wealth distribution from the well-off to the poor, the right to work, and freedom from exploitation (Kuran, 1989). This depiction of the moral economy has not only served a philosophical role by defining the notion of social justice in Islam, but has also had a practical - and profound - influence on the role of government in socio-economic life in the Arab states, in both classical and modern times. "As it relates to social policy, Islam represents a normative orientation in society about state responsibility for social welfare and social justice" (Ismael and Ismael 2008, p.26). Islamic jurists during the golden age of Arab civilization elaborated the notion of redistributive social welfare by invoking the duty of the government or ruler to guarantee its achievement. This indeed became a key norm as well as the basis for the social contract and legitimacy. Modernist Arab political thought on all sides of the spectrum during the colonial period and before the rise of independent Arab states reiterated this role of the government, which was later incorporated into national liberation movements (Ismael and Ismael 2008, p.33). Even contemporary opposition movements have continued to expound on the ideal of redistributive social welfare and the duty of the ruler to ensure it, be they Islamist or secular in nature. The norm of governmental obligation with regards to the achievement of the moral economy has thus served as a powerful force in shaping social policy and defining the government's key duties towards the people.

In the immediate post-independence period, both the nationalist-populist states and oil-based rentier states translated this ideal of redistributive social welfare and the government's lynchpin role into the rise of Arab socialism. Policies were based on a combination of socialist economic principles, state-owned enterprises and swollen public sector employment, subsidized food and basic necessities, and the guaranteed provision of healthcare and education. Maintaining such a system became a source of strength for the Arab regimes, indeed serving to reinforce authoritarian rule and non-participatory politics (Sadiki, 2000): the state would guarantee the social well-being of its citizens in return for their loyalty. In particular, these systems involved a tacit agreement between the government and key sectors, namely the working class, the poor, and the military who most benefited from the arrangement. Nonetheless, the diminishing capacities of the Arab regimes to maintain their end of the bargain, marked by decreasing social benefits, rising prices, and lack of work opportunities, lead to popular protests and acted as catalysts of political mobilization as the wave of riots throughout the region in the 1980s demonstrated. The protests amounted to calls for a recalibration of social justice and equity as well as sharp criticism of the regimes, and signalled a decline in the legitimacy of the ruling authority in the eyes of its popular

bases. The street protests and mobilisation of the lower and middle strata also signalled the development of greater civic conscience and politicisation of citizens (Irani and Funk, 2000).

In reaction to uprisings, Arab states attempted different measures to quell social protest yet proved incapable of maintaining the same social contract based on the previous economic and welfare policies: instead of populist support based on protection, subsidies, and promises of employment, Arab governments moved to co-opting the elite through market-oriented rents, amongst other quasi-liberalization strategies. However, such efforts did not successfully regain the legitimacy lost by the broken social contract, nor were they accompanied by a diminished expectation of government responsibility for fulfilling redistributive social welfare. Attempts were made to respond to this problem through new subsidy schemes and the creation of social development funds, yet it proved to be Islamist charity organizations who often filled the gaps. The region's states have tried to outflank Islamist charity organisations through policies directed towards the poor; at the same time, however, a host of other civil society organisations as well as non-Islamist traditional religious institutions have understood that the distribution of social services is in fact a new political space (Bayat, 2002). The social justice domain is thus a primary field of competition between different political forces, namely the state and its most important opposition, and a catalyst for civil society development. Moreover, the breadth of participation in popular uprisings and the so-called bread-riots throughout the region have demonstrated that the social justice question can push Arab societies to move towards more active and participatory political systems. Cultural norms of social justice act as drivers for social movements and protests, and play a significant role in determining the legitimacy of states and ruling authorities in the eyes of citizens.

For the European Union nervously eyeing the increasingly bloody unfolding of the Arab Spring and keen to promote stability and a smooth transition to democracy, the above-described socio-cultural context has several important implications for its policy programs. The wide number of programs and financial tools and the sustained and complex dialogue directed towards the Middle East all fit into a broader EU framework for achieving what is termed "structural peace" - the necessary social, economic, and political conditions to attain stability and prevent the outbreak of future conflicts. At its base, the EU's peacebuilding agenda in the region seeks to create the conditions for long-term stability and peace at both the intra- and inter-state levels: the former is to be achieved through adherence to the liberal peace tradition, while the latter relies on the externalisation of the EU's own process of regionalisation-as-peacebuilding. At the intra-state level, the European Union's agenda in the Middle East is largely focused on the political and economic reform of the region's states within the liberal model. This includes democratisation along with the development of the rule of law and human rights protection, the move to free-market economies, the development of civil society and a free press, etc... The EU's two main policy frameworks, the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, use a variety of financial instruments, positive and negative forms of incentive, as well as a host of activities and programmes to achieve these types of reform. The emphasis on political and economic reform within the liberal model reveals a particular understanding of sustainable peace and what are considered to be root causes of conflict: poverty and inequality, illegitimacy of the state, lack of respect for fundamental rights, amongst others (European Commission, 2009). For the European Union, peace is something that can be built by constructing liberal states with

a high emphasis on human security (economic and social), and thus responding to these identified sources of strife and grievance.

One of the most obvious domains where the EU's peacebuilding framework comes into a degree of clash with the socio-cultural context of the Arab world concerns questions of social justice and social peace. Embedded within the EU's approach is a view of social justice that fits clearly into an overall vision of liberal state reform as a means to promote stability and long-term peace: democracy and rule of law guarantee that each citizen is treated the same, has the same set of rights, and has the same protection from abuses; free-market economies allow each individual equal access to jobs, goods, and opportunity. In other words, the implicit idea of creating legal equality between all citizens and providing them with equal access to the law, to government, and to the market is perceived as the means to eliminate grievances and thus guarantee social peace. The state's role in such a system is thus to maintain these equal playing fields between all citizens.

This view of social justice differs from that in the Arab world on two fronts: what the contours of it are and thus what they imply for the community, and what the state's role in establishing justice is supposed to be. One of the most important differences between these two paradigms is the communitarian versus individualistic aspect: whereas the Arab vision of social justice is communitarian in the sense that it concerns the duties and responsibilities of a community towards its various members, the European notion is much more individualistic, concerned instead with each individual citizen's rights. Moreover, the understanding of equality and fairness are also different, where in one system this is achieved through rules and rights and through another it is achieved through redistribution and protection. Again, these two concepts are not mutually exclusive and indeed both notions exist in both cultural contexts. Nonetheless, the dominance of one vision over another in each cultural context is relevant as it has important consequences for how societies are structured and sources of legitimacy of the state.

What is important to note here is that the EU's understanding of social justice and its interplay with peace does not correspond to that in the Arab-Islamic context, and indeed can be working at cross purposes. Deregulated markets and a communitarian system of redistribution – even if they were to produce the same socio-economic results – are not the same thing. Likewise, transposing a democratic system from a European context onto an Arab one will not lead to an automatically legitimate system of government, as the mere right to vote is not the basis for the social contract in the Arab world. This is not to say that the various economic and political reforms the EU seeks to promote in the Middle East are not values and objectives that those in the Arab world strive for, quite the opposite. Nonetheless, in the post-revolutionary countries of the Arab world, perhaps the most effective action the EU can take right now involves helping relieve socio-economic pressures, thereby facilitating the transitional phase while responding to deeply embedded ideas of social justice and what state-society relations should look like.

Dr. Sideek Mohamed Seyad

EU Perspectives on Democracy and Fundamental Rights

The European Union (EU) started as a peace project soon after the Second World War had caused death and destruction to people and property in most of its Member States. Some of the countries which managed to get rid of the autocratic or dictatorial regime in the Middle East have also to some extent suffered in terms of destruction to their lives and property. Against this background the EU model on democracy and rule of law in such countries in transition is desirable and appropriate.

The Lisbon Treaty sets out the minimum conditions a country should fulfill to secure admission to the EU. The fundamental requirements are democracy, rule of law and respect of fundamental rights of all people irrespective of colour, sex, religion, etc. The scope and breadth of the fundamental rights are further advanced within the EU by its requirement to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights and the incorporation of the Charter on Fundamental Rights as part of the EU law.

The legal rules and the democratic institutions established within the EU could be adopted in any modern society which is in the process of transition from autocracy to democracy. Dr. Seyad's conclusions based on the accession of the new Member States of the EU from the Eastern part of Europe are that this process should be carried out in a gradual but consistent manner.

Another issue which he has highlighted in his presentation is the nature and scope of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to Egypt. There had been some concerns expressed particularly by the local population about the EU's policy towards Egypt during the height of the Arab spring. The EU policy towards the Middle East was largely influenced by the need to maintain regional stability in this region in view of the long standing confrontation between the Arab countries on the one hand and Israel on the other. This is clearly reflected in the dual approach of the EU's foreign and security policy, which is on the one hand to provide humanitarian assistance and on the other to ensure peace and stability as a whole in the entire region.

Dr. Per Jansson

International Dimensions of State-Building and Democratic Institutions

Dr. Jansson approached this very broad theme by reflecting on (1) what we really are talking about here; and (2) where the Arab spring development, Egypt included, directs us in our efforts to understand the interplay between the "domestic" and the "international". Needless to say, it is not possible to cover these issues in anything but a cursory manner.

On the first issue, Dr. Jansson suggested that when considering Egypt and Egyptian society after the revolution we are in fact confronted by some of the classical and fundamental concerns of political science. The important questions facing us are not just those of democratization, how democratic institutions can be set up and a democratic political process can get going in Egypt. The topic is the state as such, how people organize themselves for political purposes, and more to the point, *the quality of the state*,

weaknesses of the state, and how the state can possibly be strengthened. This does not exclude a focus on the development of democratic institutions, but the fundamental problem is one of state-building, or perhaps more accurately, state-reconstruction.

Strength is of course an ambiguous term in this context; totalitarian rule in many ways expresses, indeed presupposes, a strong state. In this context, however, strength and weakness of the state refer to the state's capacity to deliver values and outcomes which people basically expect a political authority to provide. *Strong or high quality states* provide *good* government, i.e. government which is on the one hand representative and accountable (usually but perhaps not necessarily this implies democracy in one form or another), on the other hand efficient; i.e. they deliver what people expect government to furnish in terms of security, rights and justice, welfare, etc. *Weak or low quality states* may be democratic from a formal point of view, but nevertheless fail to deliver the values people are looking for in legitimate government. In these terms Egyptian society is not only facing the challenges of replacing autocratic government with democratic institutions, but all the problems of building, or re-building, a state that actually can provide good government. As has been pointed out by political scientists, this involves adequate institutional arrangements and leadership, but also installing attitudes and mind-sets, which are supportive of democratic government. Working democracy is as much a matter of beliefs on behalf of citizens and political leadership, as arranging the formal political institutions of democracy.

A problem confronting all democratizing societies is great expectations about what government actually can do, and the concomitant risk of grave disappointments. To state an obvious but frequently forgotten truth, democracy is not a panacea of all social ills, and at that a slow and essentially imperfect process. One needs only recall Winston Churchill's famous dictum that "democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried". An associated problem is that of engendering preferences for policy outcomes which are consistent with the ideals of good government, such as non-corrupt practices and generally, a just society.

Obviously, the further democratic development of Egypt depends not only on domestic factors, but also on the surrounding regional and even global context. The process towards representative and accountable government can be induced and facilitated by international conditions; or hindered and slowed. The quality of states depends, as it were, to some extent on qualities of the international environment. The immediate regional context is obviously important, but so is the global set-up.

In general, domestic political processes are deeply affected by what goes on in the neighbourhood, and there is a strong association between a country's institutional make-up and the extent of democracy in the surrounding region. Demonstration effects are important. In this regard, the North African and Middle East situation is of course still undetermined. The regime change in Egypt contributes to an ongoing transformation in the region, but depends for its own success on what will emerge out of the social and political changes in the neighbourhood. Unsurprisingly, a high prior rate of regional conflict tends to decrease the likelihood of democratic development, a condition that certainly seems to apply in this case. On the other hand, adaptation of liberal institutions and increased engagement in international organizations is likely to have ameliorating effects on regional rivalry, and liberal reforms have the side-effect of making leaders accountable for mismanagement in foreign affairs.

Thus we know quite a lot about transition processes and how democratization can be induced and supported by international actors. We know less about how democracy can be sustained and survive, and what role international society can have in maintaining high quality states, in Egypt and elsewhere. A necessarily brief and incomplete answer would be to support those forces of regional as well as domestic civil society, which are willing to embrace democracy as the best possible *approximation* to good governance.

Dr. Peo Hansen

EU-African Cooperation, Migration Policies and Partnership Agreements

The presentation set out by addressing the relation between the EU's security logic, or its determination to further reinforce the barriers to migration at the external borders, and the EU's economic logic, or its determination to manage the Union's so-called demographic deficit by significantly increasing (circular) labour migration from outside the Union. Rather than conceiving of this as necessarily a contradictory relation and thus as something to be mitigated, it was argued that in the EU logic this relation is meant to make up a productive dynamic. That is, the EU wants to create a win-win dynamic between the security oriented "fight against illegal immigration", on the one side, and the growth and competitiveness oriented aspiration for a large-scale increase in labour migration, on the other.

To understand this requires an analysis that besides the political and economic aspects also considers social rights and citizenship. As was demonstrated, there is a great deal of harmony between the member states' reluctance towards migrants' permanent residence and social incorporation, on the one side, and the concepts around which they and the European Commission suggest a new labour migration regime be developed, on the other; i.e. circular migration, temporary residence, seasonal labour and return migration. To prevent migration that is deemed incompatible with this regime (e.g. refugee and family migration, or any migration implying some degree of social incorporation and hence social welfare expenditures) necessitates a militarized migration control, serving as the ultimate regulator of this enterprise.

To migrate to the EU with one's much sought-after labour thus ceases to be synonymous with the simultaneous opportunity to also migrate into a regime and community of social rights and citizenship. This means that the precarious, hyper-flexible and rightless position that has made "illegal" migrants so popular on the EU labour market in some important respects now forms the model for the EU's circular labour migration regime and its projected management of the Union's great demographic demand for new "legal" labour migrants.

As was also explained in the presentation, this needs to be understood against the background of a general European, but also global, tendency in which migration policy more and more gets detached from the fundamental issue concerning migrants' social conditions: migration policy, in other words, ceases to be embedded in policies of social incorporation. This, in turn, is structurally interlinked with a simultaneous effort to capitalize even further on the international division of labour by way of establishing this division more firmly and tangibly in the heart of Europe itself. This course of action will not only risk exacerbating ethno-racial discrimination in the EU, particularly on its already ethnically segmented labour market; with a militarized migration control serving as the new regime's ultimate regulator, it will also risk worsening the migration

crisis at the EU's external borders, as seen in the Mediterranean region. As such, the current tendency demonstrates the importance of addressing how current migration policy expresses and feeds on the political economy and geopolitics of unequal global, regional and international relations.

The presentation went on to show how these and related tendencies impact more particularly on the current development of EU migration policy vis-à-vis African countries. Unlike most current research in the area, it was argued that EU-African migration policy must be understood in its historical context. Migration between Europe and Africa has been a European concern at least since the 1920s. At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European colonial effort in Africa. Today, migration issues are to be resolved in the framework of an EU-African partnership model allegedly built on equality, interdependence and mutual "win-win" dynamics. However, a closer look at the history of EU-African migration reveals striking parallels between past and present. Throughout the period from the 1920s and onward, the migration policies devised within various frameworks of European integration have been shaped by demographic projections. Presumed demographic 'imbalances' (i.e. population surplus or deficit) have been used to justify vastly different migration regimes. Each time demography has governed European migration policy vis-à-vis Africa, what has first been introduced as a mutual interest has quickly been transformed into a geopolitical relationship, where one partner has channeled migration to its own benefit. The presentation concluded by contending that as long as scholars and intellectuals persist in imitating policy-makers' disregard of European integration's colonial history, current structural power asymmetries between the EU and Africa will not only remain obscure; we will also fail to recognize the continued, or even increasing, currency of colonial ideology in the EU's African relations, in general, and in EU-African migration policy, in particular.

Dr. Janne Holmén

Roads to Democracy(ies). Promoting Democracy through Education

Dr. Janne Holmén stated that the objective of his presentation was twofold: to stress the importance of education in promoting democracy, with examples mainly from the Swedish experience, and to inform about the masters program "Roads to Democracy(ies).

Education is an important prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. Since democracy involves the entire adult population of a country, democracy education needs to reach all levels of society.

In Sweden, the curriculum for primary schools (Folkskolan) adopted in 1919 was the first that promoted values that can be described as democratic. However, after the Second World War there was a strengthened emphasis on democracy education, since recent experience showed that democracy in Europe had been very fragile. The subject "Samhällskunskap" (social studies) grew in importance; it should inform about the functioning of the democratic system as well as promote democratic values.

The task to promote democracy has not always been easy, and it has collided with other concerns, like the importance of maintaining good relations with less democratic

regimes. In the 1970s, the curriculum prescribed “objectivity and neutrality” in the description of foreign countries, and different definitions of democracy should be explained. As a consequence, virtually all contemporary regimes were described as variants of democracy, including the Soviet Union and African single party states.

Not only the content of school education but also the methods of instruction have been used to promote democracy. Participatory pedagogy, “classroom democracy” and debates about current topics are supposed to prepare the children for participation in a democratic system as adults. At Swedish Universities, student elections are held, and many of Sweden’s politicians have started their careers as student politicians.

The masters program “Roads to Democracy(ies)”

How did democracy develop in Europe? Why did fascism and communism fail? What does democracy mean today? Today all the countries of Europe are, in a general sense, democracies and the European Union may be considered as an attempt at creating a supra-national democracy. This was not the case a century ago when few, if any, of the countries of Europe could be considered democracies in the modern sense of the word.

The joint programme (Uppsala University, Coimbra University and University of Siegen) will consider how this came about by tracing political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the development of democratic ideas, institutions, and structures in Europe in general. Because the expertise of the partners differs, the pooling of resources provides a more qualified and complete programme than would be possible at any of the individual partner universities. Students completing the programme will be able to work both in a national and international context with questions concerning human rights, international relations and politics. They will not only be better prepared for participating in doctoral programmes, but will also become better citizens, in the sense that they will more fully understand the fragility of democratic institutions and the need to constantly support them.

Summary of Group Discussions

Creating confidence and trust - from local, regional and international perspectives:

Group 1

The first group mostly discussed the internal situation with a special focus on actors likely to play a role in the democratization process. The military was brought up as one probable actor that will take part in the near future developments, although it remains uncertain *how* after the elections. The question is whether it will stick to power and remain in a political position or step back for the new government. With regard to state finances, it will be interesting to see how the new government will prioritize in the process of developing the society. Today, there is a reluctance to address this issue as it is the military elite who have impacted the political direction in the revolution.

The revolution changed the state but social conditions remain the same and a large part of the population still lives in poverty. Tensions are building up in society with regard to foreign aid and imposed interests from outside. For the moment, it is uncertain which incentives may be offered and which “models” will become guiding principles in the processes of building a new Egyptian society.

The question of how political parties may be able to counterbalance the power of the military is crucial. Political parties have been totally absent, not allowed, for three decades, and at the moment there are no indications that the emerging parties are not real and serious. They do not, however, have the prerequisites to play a genuine role of political parties in functional democracies. Civil society and media are potentially emerging pressure groups; there has for example been a boom in new, private TV-channels. These are influenced by businessmen and private interests and at times defending the position of the state, but many free channels ought anyway to create a better stance at democracy than just a few.

Unfortunately, the Mubarak regime was successful in promoting corruption at all levels and sectors of society, and parts of society profiting from this are now defending their position to keep their benefits. The vast economic divide in income and social class has created serious tensions in society, influenced by the last years’ programs of privatization and increased unemployment. There is also a cultural divide of the European/modern influenced way of life and the traditional or old cultures. The Gulf-countries, especially Saudi, Arabia play an important influential role in this and the values are not particularly Islamic, but Saudi. This will probably have an impact in Egypt’s foreign policy. Egypt continues to play an influential role in the region and how this will be carried out in the near future is unclear. Peace orientation is generally accepted, and people are probably not prepared for any more tension than is already existing in the region.

Whether or not the EU has any role to play at all in this development is also uncertain. A new Egyptian regime would probably not want any dependency to either the EU or the US.

Group 2

Also this group started with presenting perspectives on local dimensions of the future democracy building processes. Although the state will not be run by religious principles, they could be a considerable force to be utilized in building trust in society. Sweden served as one example where trust-building was achieved in this way. Opening up for new ways, and even ideological ways, of thinking may enhance the development of a new, democratic society.

Youth and employment programs should become important parts of the economic reforms and as such, these programs will also become a basis for creating trust. In addition, school subjects need to be reviewed replacing former propaganda.

Regarding the international perspective on creating trust, the EU may not have any role to play at all, due to lack of confidence and credibility. It is expected that the EU would not engage in any charitable support, but would demand something in return for its support. Also, at least when it comes to critical issues, the presence of the EU in the MENA-region is missing. In order to be able to play a part, the EU would have to increase its presence and balance its interests. The prospects for individual states, even EU member states, in future cooperation are probably better - even perhaps also for the European Council.

Regionally, there is great uncertainty today as to which falling autocracies will be replaced by democratic states in the end. This is also a matter of national identity. Egypt has a considerable "cultural capital" in the region, which could be used as a tool towards democratization. On the other hand, the EU and the US are under suspicion. In addition, they have a record of supporting leaders such as Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gadaffi. Also, regionally, the army will probably have an important role to play.

Delayed elections increase suspicion in society. Normally in transition periods, the first elections constitute an important first step in a long process.

There are misunderstandings between the cultures of European or western societies and the MENA-region, where the people of the Middle East often have more knowledge about values and ways of thinking in Europe, than the opposite. This is a result of historical power relations. There is a need to learn from each other, and particularly for the west to learn from the east. The EU needs to learn that changes may come and that corrupt leaders may be displaced. The EU needs to take this into account when forming and taking responsibility for its foreign policy.

Also uncertain is the international community's response to these changes to come, whatever they may be, and the internal affairs affecting international relations. For example, what happens if a republican party gets into power in the US? Many factors remain unclear regarding interference and future developments.

Future cooperation

From the discussions, the following suggestions for future cooperation and collaboration were presented:

- Research cooperation: research project of *social capital, human relations* and *dialogue between civilizations*.
- Student and teacher exchange: Sweden and Alexandria, existing courses could be adapted to fill a place within the USI network program.
- Relevant subjects for cooperation include elections, corruption, civil society, democracy in practice, media and emergency laws and migration. Gender issues should be mainstreamed in all activities.
- Not only senior professors, but also PhD students, should be included in the cooperation, to ensure long-term relationships.
- Hands-on seminars and training seminars on Sweden-Egypt cooperation in reference to the EU and Bologna processes. How to connect with the EU?
- Imperative that seminars should have a long-term impact.
- Joint courses and programs
- SwedAlex can be hosting seminars in Alexandria or Sweden; create the forum for current events, inviting researchers, students, politicians and the civil society to take part in those seminars in order to spread knowledge.